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Abstract 
This article uses the IMF’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) to 
assess the impact of fiscal consolidation on the Czech economy. Its contribution is three-
fold. First, it provides estimates of dynamic fiscal multipliers for a variety of fiscal instru-
ments (tax and expenditure), consolidation durations, assumptions about credibility, and 
monetary policy responses. Second, the article evaluates the impact on the economy of 
tightening measures envisaged in the 2011 budget. Third, the article considers alternative 
packages for consolidation beyond 2011 to achieve the government’s balanced budget 
target by 2016 and identifies which forms of adjustment are more “growth-friendly.” 
1. Introduction 
The combination of structural deficits during the boom years and recent anti- 
-crisis stimulus measures had put Czech public finances on an unsustainable trajec-
tory. An austerity package implemented in 2010 contained the fiscal deficit, but was 
not sufficient to ensure sustainability. The government that came to power in the sum-
mer of 2010 set out ambitious consolidation objectives, seeking to bring the general 
government deficit under 3 percent of GDP by 2013, in line with the Czech Repub-
lic’s European Union (EU) commitment, and to balance the budget by 2016. As a step 
toward fulfilling these objectives, the 2011 budget includes a wide range of meas-
ures, mostly on the expenditure side, that would reduce the deficit in 2011 by nearly 
2 percent of GDP relative to the baseline of unchanged policies.
1  These measures are 
expected to stay in place in subsequent years. The government has also outlined a leg-
islative agenda covering, among others, pension, health care and social benefits reforms, 
but no concrete measures have been specified as of yet to achieve the government’s 
medium-term targets.
2  
The pace of fiscal adjustment and the choice of instruments are two important 
issues facing policy makers. The economy has considerable excess capacity and mone-
tary policy has limited room to cushion the impact of the consolidation. In these cir-
cumstances, the confidence-building benefits of a front-loaded fiscal adjustment should 
be weighed against the cost to growth in the short run. For that reason, it is particu-
larly important at the  current juncture to have reliable estimates of the  impact of 
fiscal consolidation on the economy.  
That impact depends not only on the size of the tightening in a given year, but 
also on a variety of other factors, including the length of the adjustment, its credibil-
1 The reduction in deficit relative to 2010 would be smaller, since the fiscal balance would deteriorate in
2011 under unchanged policies. 
2 One exception is a new lottery tax that the government plans to put in place in 2012. The tax is projected
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ity, the choice of fiscal instruments, and the ability of monetary policy to accom-
modate the fiscal shock. It should be kept in mind that the effect of even a short-term 
shock is typically spread over several years. The choice of the instrument matters 
because various taxes differ in their distortionary impact, and because components of 
government expenditure have different effects on private-sector behavior, aggregate 
demand, and potential output. 
This article uses a modern, open-economy dynamic structural general equilib-
rium model with non-Ricardian features, calibrated to the Czech economy. It makes 
three principal contributions. First, it provides a set of dynamic fiscal multipliers for 
a standardadized shock (1 percentage point improvement in the ratio of fiscal balance 
to GDP) implemented through a variety of fiscal instruments (taxes and expendi-
tures), for different shock durations (1  year, 10 years, and a  permanent improve-
ment), and under different assumptions about the  credibility of adjustment and 
the flexibility of monetary policy. These results are of interest by themselves as they 
reflect country-specific characteristics. They could also be used to evaluate the im-
pact of any proposed package as it could be represented as a linear combination of 
basic shocks.
3 Second, the  article assesses the  effect of the  consolidation package 
introduced in the 2011 budget on the economy. Third, it takes up the issue of which 
instruments should be used to achieve further consolidation in line with the govern-
ment’s medium-term objectives. The  article demonstrates that both the  short-term 
and the long-term impact on GDP can vary dramatically depending on the choice of 
the instruments.  
The article is structured as follows. The  next section reviews the  literature   
on fiscal multipliers, particularly the estimates for the Czech Republic. Section III 
provides a  brief overview of the  Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal (GIMF) 
model – the model used in this article – focusing on the features relevant for fiscal 
policy and on calibration to the Czech Republic. The following three sections present 
the main results of the article: the dynamic multipliers; the impact of the 2011 pack-
age; and the  alternative paths toward further consolidation. The  last section con-
cludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on fiscal multipliers and more broadly on the effects that fiscal 
policy shocks have on the economy is large and inconclusive. Over the last three 
years, the interest in the topic has been spurred first by fiscal stimulus and then by 
subsequent consolidation undertaken across the globe. We refer the reader to a sur-
vey paper by Spilimbergo, Symansky, and Schindler (2009) for a broad literature 
review and a  range of estimates for a  variety of countries. Broadly, the  literature 
finds that fiscal multipliers are higher for larger countries with less trade openness. 
Also multipliers are found to be larger when monetary authorities do not offset 
the impact of the fiscal shock, as highlighted by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 
(2009). Expenditure measures, particularly changes in government investment, tend 
to have higher multipliers than revenue measures. The Spilimbergo, Symansky, Schind-
ler paper suggests a rule-of-thumb government consumption multiplier of 0.5 or less 
3 This includes a discretionary loosening of fiscal policy – e.g., to provide stimulus to the economy. All 
that is required is to reverse the sign. 308                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4 
for small open economies, with smaller values (about half) likely for revenue and 
transfers, and slightly larger ones for investment spending.  
We will focus in this section on the estimates specific to the Czech Republic. 
OECD (2009) reports estimates for government expenditure multiplier coming out of 
its reduced-form INTERLINK model. The Czech Republic has the lowest value among 
the countries in the sample, around 0.3. The same publication also provides multi-
pliers for several specific fiscal instruments, obtained by first averaging estimates 
across a number of studies for several different countries, and then adjusting these 
averages for each country’s degree of openness. For the Czech Republic, these de-
rived multipliers vary in the first year from 0.1 for indirect taxes to 0.7 for govern-
ment investment, rising to a range of 0.2 to 1.1 in the second year.  
Barrel et al. (2004) examined government consumption multipliers for Eastern 
European countries in an econometric model with some forward-looking elements. 
Their estimates suggest that the government consumption multiplier is around 0.4 for 
the Czech Republic.  
In an approach similar to ours, a recent paper by Štork and Závacká (2010) 
uses a simple DSGE model with some non-Ricardian features (specifically, the pres-
ence of liquidity-constrained households) to look at the impact of several different 
fiscal shocks on the real economy. The quarterly frequency of the model and the way 
the shocks are specified makes it difficult to compare directly their results with ours, 
but in line with the  findings of our, richer model, fiscal multipliers appear to be 
small. 
The fiscal multiplier used by the Czech National Bank (CNB) appears to be 
around 0.5–0.6, as can be inferred from its estimates of the impact of fiscal consoli-
dation measures on real GDP. A one percent of GDP reduction in fiscal deficit in 2008 
was expected to reduce real GDP in that year by 0.5 percent (CNB, 2007), while 
a 1.3 percent of GDP reduction in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance projected 
for 2011 is expected to lower output by 0.8 percent. 
3. Description of the Model 
This article uses an annual two-country version of the GIMF calibrated for 
the Czech Republic and the European Union. To save space, this section focuses on 
the relevant aspects of the model for fiscal consolidation. A complete description of 
the theoretical structure of the model can be found in Kumhof et al. (2010).  
3.1 Summary 
GIMF is a multi-country dynamic structural general equilibrium model in wide 
use at the IMF and several central banks. The model is micro-founded with optimiz-
ing behavior by households and firms, and full intertemporal stock-flow accounting. 
Keynesian properties are derived from frictions in the  form of real and nominal 
adjustment costs, liquidity-constrained agents, and finite planning horizons of house-
holds. These features provide non-neutrality in both spending-based and revenue- 
-based fiscal measures. They also help portray the interaction of fiscal and monetary 
policies, which makes the model particularly suitable to analyze fiscal consolidation.  
Labor and capital supply is endogenous in the model, allowing it to capture 
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government deficits crowd out private investment and net foreign assets in the long 
run and can lead to a higher real world interest rate, which is endogenous in GIMF. 
The underlying overlapping generations and finite horizon structure allows us to ex-
plore private saving behavior that is critical in both the dynamics and comparative 
statics of the model.
4  
The multi-country structure of GIMF captures the  effects of international 
spillovers from trade. Bilateral trade flows of intermediate and final goods and their 
relative prices are explicitly modeled between each region based on recent historical 
averages. In contrast to the rich trade structure, GIMF’s treatment of international 
asset markets is somewhat rudimentary, which is common for large multi-country 
models. The only assets traded internationally are nominal non-contingent one-period 
bonds denominated in euros. Government debt is only owned domestically, in the form 
of nominal non-contingent one-period bonds denominated in domestic currency. Firms 
are also only owned domestically and pay out a share of profits in the form of lump- 
-sum dividends. While these assumptions might be too simplistic to analyze the propa-
gation of financial shocks, they should not be critical to the examination of the im-
pact of fiscal consolidation, which is essentially a demand shock affecting other 
countries primarily via the trade channel. 
There are two types of households in GIMF – those that are liquidity-con-
strained and those that are not. Both types of households pay direct taxes on labor 
income, indirect taxes on consumption spending, and a  lump-sum tax. Liquidity- 
-constrained households (LIQ) consume all their income in every period, while 
the unconstrained overlapping-generation households (OLG) can smooth their con-
sumption. The presence of OLG households with finite horizons and the arrival of 
new generations mean that public debt is counted as net wealth by households. 
Lower debt levels reduce tax obligations required to service government debt. Since 
households discount the reduction in future tax obligations, a decrease in government 
debt today represents to them a decrease in their wealth. This is because some of 
the resulting lower taxes in the future are enjoyed beyond their planning horizon.
5  
Production in GIMF is multi-layered. Capital and labor produce tradable and 
non-tradable goods. Capital is supplied by entrepreneurs with a procyclical financial 
accelerator as found in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Firms have finite 
planning horizons in accordance with the  preferences of their owners, the  over-
lapping generation households. They pay capital income taxes to governments and 
wages and dividends to households. Labor is mobile across sectors but not across 
countries. Physical capital is sector-specific and is also immobile across countries, 
but trade in investment goods eases the restrictiveness of this assumption. 
3.2 Fiscal Instruments 
In GIMF, there are seven main instruments at the disposal of fiscal authorities: 
government consumption and investment, three types of taxes, and transfers to two 
groups of households. It is helpful to understand the characteristics of these instruments 
to identify their real-world parallels as well as to interpret their impact in the model. 
4 See Blanchard (1985) for the basic theoretical building blocks.  
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Government investment accumulates into a stock of public infrastructure that 
depreciates at a rate of 4 percent per year. A higher stock of public infrastructure is 
assumed to increase the productivity in the production of the domestic final good. 
This is in line with a large body of literature (e.g., Aschauer, 1989, and Devarajan et 
al., 1996) that found that public capital increases private-sector productivity. The elas-
ticity of aggregate output with respect to public infrastructure is 0.14, the mid-range 
of estimates obtained in Ligthart and Suárez  (2005). An  interpretation of this re-
lationship is that higher quality public infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and 
heath facilities, improves the productivity of the private sector. In contrast, govern-
ment consumption expenditure is assumed to have no effect on productivity.  
The fiscal authority may utilize lump-sum general transfers or targeted trans-
fers to liquidity-constrained households. General transfers affect directly the budget 
constraints of both OLG and LIQ households based on their share of total consump-
tion in the  economy. Thus, in case of a  cut in general transfers, a  large share of 
the  burden falls on households who have access to the  financial markets (OLG 
agents) and can adjust their labor and saving decisions. A reduction in targeted trans-
fers to LIQ households results in an immediate reduction in consumption of similar 
degree in that period. Examples of such targeted transfers include social welfare 
programs. 
Revenue can accrue from distortionary taxes on labor and capital income or 
on private consumption expenditure. In GIMF, the labor income tax broadly corre-
sponds to payroll taxes, regardless of whether they are levied on employees or employ-
ers, and personal income taxes. An increase in labor taxes results in distortionary 
effects in the labor market, reducing the equilibrium level of hours worked. The capi-
tal tax primarily represents the corporate income tax. An increase in the capital tax 
distorts investment decisions, resulting in a fall in the level of investment and a re-
duction in the capital stock. The output losses caused by both of these taxes are 
significant, since they reduce the  factors of production in the  economy. The  con-
sumption tax is more growth-friendly, as it does not distort a factor of production. 
This tax comprises sales taxes, VAT, and excises. 
3.3 Policy Rules 
The fiscal policy rule in the model has two main functions. The first is to 
stabilize the ratio of government debt to GDP ratio. This feature eliminates the pos-
sibility of default and insures dynamic stability. Second, it reacts as an automatic 
stabilizer to business cycle. The strength of the automatic stabilizer comes from OECD 
estimates reported in Girouard and André (2005). The fiscal rule targets the overall 
fiscal balance in accordance with the two above criteria. In this article, the instru-
ments that are assumed to adjust to make sure the fiscal rule is satisfied are labor 
income taxes or general transfers.  
The central bank credibly operates under an inflation targeting regime with 
a Taylor-type interest rate reaction function. The policy rate responds in a forward- 
-looking way to the gap between the projected and target inflation to achieve a stable 
target rate of inflation. The target rate is assumed to be 2 percent in both the Euro-
pean Union and the Czech Republic. The coefficient on the gap of projected to target 
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Union has respective coefficients of 1.48 and 0.34. The coefficients in the monetary 
policy rule have been calibrated to match desired inflation dynamics for a wide vari-
ety of shocks at annual frequency. The calibration of the monetary policy rule for 
the Czech Republic is informed by models in use at the CNB and is consistent with 
past GIMF models of the Czech Republic as in Laxton and Kumhof (2009a) and 
Allard and Muñoz (2008). The calibration of the monetary policy rule for the Euro-
pean Union is based on recent estimates by IMF staff and is consistent with models at 
use at IMF and European Central Bank. 
3.4 Calibration  
The comprehensive structure of GIMF gives it the ability to replicate the key 
aspects of the Czech Republic economy in its calibration. The steady-state national 
account decompositions are calibrated to match recent numbers from the IMF Inter-
national Financial Statistics database. Goods trade flows are calibrated to replicate 
United Nations comtrade statistics database. The gross government debt ratios match 
data for 2010. The calibration of the structural parameters relies heavily on the lit-
erature as summarized in as in Kumhof et al. (2010) and is consistent with previous 
modeling efforts of the Czech Republic at such as in Allard and Muñoz (2008) and 
Laxton and Kumhof (2009a). The trade elasticities are set to match the stylized facts 
of trade for small open economies. The values of adjustment parameters and the shares 
of liquidity-constrained consumers were informed by matching the  dynamics of 
models at use in the CNB and small open economy models at the IMF. The calibra-
tion is summarized in Appendix I. 
4. Estimates of the Impact of Fiscal Consolidation 
Many factors can influence the impact of fiscal consolidation, thus negating 
the possibility of one simple multiplier. As discussed above, each type of fiscal in-
strument will impart different effects on the economy given its particular charac-
teristics. We examine the  seven instruments already introduced in Section III to 
understand their properties. This includes consolidation with government consump-
tion and investment expenditure, general transfers and targeted transfers to liquidity- 
-constrained households, taxes on labor and capital income, and consumption taxes. 
The fiscal instrument that adjusts to satisfy the fiscal rule is assumed to be the labor 
tax. We also provide simulations where general transfers are assumed to adjust to 
satisfy the fiscal rule. General transfers are non-distortionary and have a small direct 
effect on consumption behavior, which helps isolate the impact of the fiscal instru-
ment used for the consolidation.  
The magnitude of the shock will clearly affect the response. The relationship 
between the size of the shock and the size of the response is approximately linear.
6 
Hence, to produce standardized numbers, we allow for shocks to increase the target 
6 Since the experiments are conducted as shocks to the steady state, the output gap is assumed to be zero at
the beginning of the shock. Some researchers (e.g., Baum and Koester, 2011) have found that spending multi-
pliers depend on the cyclical state of the economy. This distinction is not incorporated in GIMF. At the same
time, part of the difference may be due to the fact that monetary authorities might react differently to fiscal
contraction or expansions depending on the amount of spare capacity. In some of the simulations below,
we turn off the offsetting response of monetary authorities to fiscal shocks, leading to larger fiscal multi-
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level of the deficit-to-GDP ratio by 1 percentage point. This provides a simple way to 
examine the “multiplier” of the shock which is defined as the change in real GDP 
over the size of the consolidation in terms of deficit-to-GDP.  
The duration of the shock may also influence the impact of fiscal consolida-
tion. Consequently, we explore alternative assumptions about the duration of the fiscal 
consolidation as show in Appendix II, allowing the tightening to last for one year, ten 
years, or to be permanent. For the one-year consolidation, we assume that there is no 
impact on the long-run debt-to-GDP ratio. The ten-year consolidation results in a re-
duction in the debt-to-GDP ratio by eight percentage points. In a permanent consoli-
dation, the  ratio goes down by 23  percentage points after 50 years. These three 
scenarios aim to replicate three different situations. A government that faces no under-
lying deficit problem, but would like to reduce its stock of debt (e.g., to satisfy 
the Stability and Growth Pact limit or to reverse the run-up in debt induced by 
the crisis), would increase the fiscal balance for a period of time until it reaches its 
goal. A government whose deficits are not sustainable needs to reduce them perma-
nently. A one-year fiscal tightening may not be the most policy-relevant experiment, 
but reversing all the  signs allows one to obtain the  impact of a  short-term fiscal 
stimulus. 
The impact of fiscal consolidation will depend on private agents’ assessment 
of credibility of the fiscal authority. If agents perceive that the consolidation is not 
credible, they would expect any announced consolidation to be reversed in the future 
and thus not to have a sustained impact on the deficit. In this scenario, the impact of 
the consolidation will occur without the perceived benefits of lower future tax obliga-
tions and real interest rates. In this article, we simulate a non-credible consolidation 
by assuming that agents perceive the consolidation to be temporary, and expect that 
the consolidation will be reversed after one year.  
In most of the simulations we assume it will take one year for long-term consol-
idation to become credible. This is implemented by doing a temporary one-year con-
solidation in the first year of the simulation and then starting a credible consolidation in 
the following year. When the consolidation becomes credible, agents perceive long- 
-term or permanent change in the deficit. To evaluate the impact of consolidation with 
different assumptions about credibility, we compare cases where consolidation is as-
sumed to become credible immediately or after one, two, or three years. Comparing 
across instruments and credibility assumptions, we are able to gain insight into the role 
of credibility for different instruments.  
The impact of the consolidation will depend on the interaction between 
the monetary and fiscal authorities. The discount rate in the Czech Republic has been 
25 basis points since August 2009, and the policy rate, the two week repo rate, has 
been at 75 basis points since May 2010. Given the low rates, we examine the case 
where the monetary authority does not react to the fall in inflation. In this case, we 
find that consolidaion has larger adverse effects since the monetary authority cannot 
reduce the policy rate to mitigate the fall in real GDP and inflation resulting from 
the consolidation. For each instrument, duration, and credibility assumption, we eval-
uate the impact of the consolidation where the policy rate does not react for one or 
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Table 1  Impact of Fiscal Consolidation on Real GDP by Instrument 
a 
Percent Deviation from Baseline 
Instrument / Year  1  2  3  4  5  SS
b 
Labor tax  -0.13  -0.32  -0.43  -0.50  -0.54  0.07 
Consumption tax  -0.12  -0.17  -0.13  -0.10  -0.07  0.07 
Capital tax  -0.02  -0.17  -0.19  -0.22  -0.30  0.05 
Government consumption  -0.40  -0.25  -0.10  -0.01   0.02  0.07 
Government investment  -0.42  -0.42  -0.40  -0.44  -0.53  0.08 
General transfers  -0.07  -0.04   0.07   0.16   0.21  0.06 
Transfers to LIQ  -0.23  -0.21  -0.13  -0.08  -0.08  0.07 
Average tax  -0.09  -0.22  -0.25  -0.27  -0.30  0.06 
Average cons and inv  -0.41  -0.34  -0.25  -0.23  -0.26  0.08 
Average transfers  -0.15  -0.13  -0.03   0.04   0.07  0.07 
 
Notes:
a The shock is a 1 percent of GDP improvement in the overall fiscal balance lasting 10 years under the as-
sumptions of no constraint on policy interest rate and credibility starting in year 2. 
Labor taxes are the instrument responsible for satisfying the fiscal rule. 
 b Steady state 
4.1 Summary of the Results 
In this subsection we summarize the impact of a 10-year shock to each of 
GIMF’s seven fiscal instrument on real GDP under the assumption that credibility  
is achieved in the second year and imposing no constraint on monetary policy. 
The labor tax is the instrument that adjusts to satisfy the fiscal rule. We also show 
how altering these assumptions affects the results in case of one of the instruments – 
government consumption expenditures. A full set of dynamic multipliers along with 
a detailed discussion of the impact on the economy of shocks to each instrument can 
be found in Appendix II. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the deviations of real GDP from the baseline in 
the  first 5 years after a  one  percent of GDP fiscal tightening that lasts 10 years.
7 
The  table also shows the  long-term (steady-state) impact. In the  first year private 
agents assume the tightening to last only one year, and only in the second year do 
they start anticipating correctly the duration of fiscal adjustment.
8 We do not impose 
 
the zero-bound constraint on monetary policy, as we would like to focus on a typical 
rather than an exceptional situation. 
Fiscal consolidation via government consumption and investment expenditure 
has a direct impact on aggregate demand resulting in the highest multipliers relative 
to the other instruments. The import components of final consumption and invest-
ment goods are 46 and 62 percent, respectively. These large import shares result in 
substantial leakages into imports. The impact of a cut in government investment on 
real GDP is persistent due to the loss of productivity from a lower stock of public 
infrastructure. Since the depreciation rate of public capital is rather small and the size 
 
7 Since the model is calibrated rather than estimated, confidence bands around the impulse responses are
not available. 
8 This standard assumption reflects the reality that expectations take time to adjust and credibility takes
time to be gained. In addition, this assumption appears to capture better the dynamics of output response in
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Figure 1  Impact of 10 Year 1 Percent of GDP Improvement  
                 in Fiscal Balance on Real GDP 
Percent Deviation from Baseline 
              
 
of the consolidation is rather large, representing approximately a quarter of all govern-
ment investment, there is a large and persistent reduction in public capital and it takes 
a long time for the economy to return to the steady state after the consolidation. 
Unlike cuts in government consumption or investment, fiscal consolidation 
with general transfers does not have a direct impact on aggregate demand. As the gov-
ernment decreases transfers to households, OLG agents respond by borrowing in 
the short run to finance their consumption, which they prefer to smooth. The impact 
on LIQ agents is more pronounced since they consume their present income resulting 
in an immediate reduction in consumption by a similar magnitude to their loss in 
income. For general transfers, the impact on aggregate demand is not large since LIQ 
agents account for only a fraction of overall consumption of the economy. However, 
a cut in targeted transfers to LIQ households results in a reduction of consumption 
close to the size of the consolidation, but the effect on output is muted because of 
consumption leakages into imports.  
Fiscal consolidation with labor and capital income taxes reduces the income 
of households and increases distortions in the labor and capital markets. These dis-
tortions result in a fall in labor supply and capital stock, thereby reducing important 
factors of production. It is interesting to note that the effect of higher capital and 
labor taxes on output accumulates over time, as the factor supply adjusts gradually in 
response to the tax change, while the impact of lower government consumption and 
transfers is highest in the  first year. Fiscal consolidation with consumption taxes 
affects aggregate demand via its impact on household consumption. Although indi-
rect taxes distort the consumption decision, they do not affect a factor of production, 
resulting in a smaller impact on output. 
The long-run crowding-in effects come primarily from two channels. First, 
the reduction in the debt level requires lower payments on interest to service the debt, 
allowing for lower tax obligations in the long run. As this happens, labor taxes will 
fall permanently relative to the baseline, improving the income of households and 
spurring labor supply. Second, the reduction in the debt level is an increase in the sav-
ings of the economy. This reduces the equilibrium real interest rate. However, since 
the  economy of the  Czech Republic comprises a  small share of the  world’s GDP, 
the impact of lowering its fiscal deficit by one percent of GDP for 10 years on real 
interest rates is only 0.25 basis points. The model assumes no additional change in 
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Figure 2  Impact of One Percent of GDP Cut in Government Consumption  
on Real GDP Under Different Assumptions
* 
Percent Deviation from Baseline 





















































Notes: * Except for the parameter varied, the shock lasts for 10 years; it becomes credible in year 2; policy 
interest rate is not constrained; the residual fiscal instrument is the labor tax. That scenario is shown 
by the solid line.  
 
4.2 Factors Affecting the Multiplier 
Figure 2 summarizes fiscal multipliers for government-consumption-based 
consolidation across a variety of factors that influence the multiplier. Panel A shows 
how the duration of the shock affects the multiplier. The impact is the same in 
the first year for all the durations as we assume that it takes one year for the consol- 
 
idation to achieve credibility. The impact on output reverses after a year for the one 
year of consolidation, and the ten-year and permanent consolidation suppresses out-
put below baseline for several years. The impact of the 10-year and permanent con-
solidation in the medium term is nearly identical, but diverges substantially in 
the long run as public debt declines considerably more if the cut in government con-
sumption is permanent. 
As panel B shows, if the zero-interest floor (ZIF) is binding, the impact of 
the consolidation on GDP worsens. Since the monetary authority cannot reduce in-
terest rates when the consolidation reduces inflation, there are no offsetting effects 
from a  lower real interest rate on demand. The  longer the  ZIF binds, the  greater 
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Table 2  Comparison of One-year Temporary Fiscal Multipliers 
Model   GIMF  Coenen et al. (2010)  OECD (2009) 
Instrument (below); 
                            Country (right)  Czech Rep.  U.S.  Euro Area  Czech Rep. 
Labor tax  0.13  0.10-0.35  0.05-0.30  0.2 
Consumption tax  0.13  0.30-0.35  0.20-0.30  - 
Capital tax  0.03  0.01-0.11  0.03-0.06  - 
Government consumption  0.41  0.80-1.20  0.95-1.00  0.3 
Government investment  0.44  0.95-1.15  0.95-1.00  0.7 
General transfers  0.08  0.10-0.50  0.05-0.25  0.2 
Transfers to LIQ  0.23  0.40-1.15  0.25-0.70  - 
 
The sooner credibility is achieved, as shown by panel C, the sooner agents 
perceive the long-term benefits of consolidation which mitigates the output losses. 
Credibility plays slightly different roles across instruments depending on which 
households are affected and whether the  instrument of consolidation has a  direct 
impact on factors of production. This is demonstrated in Appendix II.  
Finally, in panel D, if general transfers rather than labor income taxes are used 
to satisfy the fiscal rule, the gains in the long run from lower distortions in labor 
markets and higher labor supply are not realized, and real GDP will be essentially 
unchanged in the long term.  
4.3 Comparison of Czech-Specific Multipliers with Other Estimates 
The short-run multipliers are consistent with those in Coenen et al. (2010) and 
OECD (2009). The one-year multipliers from these two papers without a binding ZIF 
for the Czech Republic, the euro area and the United States are compared to the re-
sults found in this article for the Czech Republic in Table 2. 
9  
The short-run multipliers for transfers and tax instruments are consistent   
with the lower range of estimates for the Euro Area and the United States in Coenen 
et al. (2010). They find that higher nominal rigidities and more openness to trade in 
the Euro Area contribute to produce smaller multipliers relative to the United States. 
Imports in the Czech Republic as a percent of GDP are almost quadruple those of 
the Euro Area. We find larger spillovers into imports in the Czech Republic relative 
to the Euro Area, but this is offset somewhat by a higher share of liquidity-con-
strained households in the Czech Republic relative to the Euro Area calibrations in 
Coenen et al. (2010).  
The short-run multipliers for transfers and labor taxes are smaller than those 
found in OECD (2009). The multipliers in OECD (2009) are calculated using an av-
erage multiplier for OECD countries, scaled for openness to trade and judgmentally 
adjusted. Since the  multipliers for other countries in OECD  (2009) are consistent 
with estimates of GIMF, the difference with the estimates for the Czech Republic is 
mostly related to the degree of spillovers into imports. 
The largest difference between the multipliers compared to Coenen et al. (2010) 
is observed for government consumption and investment shocks. We find multipliers 
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over half of those estimated for the Euro Area. This derives from the higher openness 
in the Czech Republic to trade relative to the countries considered in that paper, since 
consumption and investment instruments have a direct impact on aggregate demand 
and can spill directly into imports.  
The largest discrepancies between our estimates of multipliers and those in 
OECD (2009) are for government investment. Productivity spillovers of government 
investment on GDP are difficult to estimate, and empirical estimates for the Czech 
Republic are not available. The calibration of the relationship between public capital 
and potential output in GIMF is based on meta analysis as described in Ligthart and 
Suárez (2005). We believe, however, that since the increase in investment expendi-
ture only lasts for one year in these simulations, there would be limited effect on 
the public capital stock, and hence productivity.  
5. The Impact of 2011 Tightening 
This section analyzes the impact on the economy of the consolidation meas-
ures adopted by the government in its 2011 budget. The package would reduce 
the structural primary balance (relative to the baseline of unchanged policies) in 2011 
by 1.95 percent of GDP, with about ¾ of the consolidation coming from the expendi-
ture side. Appendix III provides a detailed description of the package and how its 
components are mapped into fiscal instruments available in GIMF.  
In the simulations, the largest measure is a cut in government consumption, 
which accounts for nearly one half of the consolidation. About a third of that cut 
comes from a reduction in the government’s wage bill, to be implemented via a com-
bination of salary decreases and personnel cuts. The reduction in expenditures of 
general treasury is also included in this category. The bulk of the revenue adjustment 
is coded as an increase in the labor tax. It reflects increases in social security con-
tributions and in the personal income tax.
10  
The government intends the measures adopted for 2011 to stay in place in sub-
sequent years as well, so we model the adjustment as permanent. The government 
has also announced its expenditure ceilings and fiscal balance targets for 2012–13 as 
well as its intention to balance the budget (providing economic growth continues) 
in 2016. In view of the fact that the government has not yet specified measures that 
would bring about that adjustment, we cannot model its impact on the economy, 
since the effect depends on the composition of the adjustment, not just its size. Hence, 
in this simulation we assume only one small additional meausure noted in footnote 3 
above in 2012 and no further changes, with the improvement in the overall general 
government balance staying 2.1 percent relative to the baseline in perpetuity. We do, 
however, take up the issue of further tightening in Section VI. 
Credibility of fiscal consolidation and the reaction of monetary policy are im-
portant for the assesment of fiscal policy effects. In our main scenario we assume that 
the consolidation package will become credible after one year, once the government 
has managed to stick to its commitments in 2011 and submitted a 2012 budget that 
maintains the 2011 measures. This means that in 2011 private agents are assumed to 
 
10 The payroll tax measure keeps in place the adjustments that had already been adopted for 2010, but were
supposed to expire in 2011. Again, the baseline for our assessment is given by the policies that would be in
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Figure 3  Impact of 2011 Package on Real GDP and Inflation  
Deviation from Baseline, Percent or Percentage Points 
                 
believe that the 2011 measures would be rolled back in 2012, and it is only in 2012 
that they become convinced that the tightening is permanent.  
We assume that the policy interest rate will not be reduced further in 2011 to 
mitigate the impact of fiscal consolidation on real GDP and inflation. There is very 
limited room for lowering the policy rates in the Czech Republic, and the central 
bank is likely to keep this room so it can react to a major unanticipated shock. There 
are no constraints on monetary policy from 2012 onwards.
11 We discuss the sensi-
tivity of our results to these assumptions at the end of this section. 
The long-term impact of fiscal consolidation depends on the residual fiscal 
instrument. Lower overall government deficits in the simulation will decrease public 
debt relative to the baseline, which gradually reduces the interest bill. For the given 
overall balance, lower interest payments would eventually allow the government to 
run a lower primary surplus, letting it reduce taxes or increase some non-interest 
spending. We assume that the government would cut payroll taxes when given fiscal 
room. Such a choice would be sensible, since payroll taxes have a large deadweight 
cost and are relatively high in the Czech Republic compared to other European coun-
tires.  
Figure 3 shows the impact of the 2011 package on output and inflation. Real 
GDP would decline 0.7 percent in the first year relative to the baseline. Then growth 
would turn positive, although not enough to offset the impact on output level for 
a protracted period of time. In the long run, however, real GDP would be 0.2 percent 
higher thanks to the eventual reduction in the distortive payroll taxes. In the mean-
time, CPI inflation would be lower by about 10 basis points for a few years, ulti-
mately converging back to its target. The fairly low short-term fiscal multiplier for 
this package is in line with the results obtained in Section IV for individual shocks 
and reflects the  openness of the  Czech economy and the  structure of the  consoli-
dation. 
To understand better the reasons for the small size of the multiplier, it is use-
ful to consider the impact of the consolidation package on other macroeconomic vari-
ables, such as GDP components, interest and exchange rates, and current account 
balance.  
Private saving would decline initially as household income goes down as a re-
sult of consolidation measures, but not enough to stop consumption from falling. 
 
11 This reflects the expectation that in the absence of consolidation the policy rate would move up by 2012
sufficiently so that the effective floor on the interest rate would no longer be binding.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4                                    319 
Figure 4  Contributions to Real GDP Deviation from Baseline 
Percent of Baseline GDP 
                  
 
Private investment would also go down, reacting to the prospect of lower GDP in 
the near future. Government spending will decline by design. Partially offsetting 
these negatives will be a positive contribution from net exports, thanks to both lower 
imports and higher exports in response to a decline in domestic demand and, after 
2011, a  weaker real exchange rate.
12 Given the  high degree of trade openness of 
the Czech Republic, this offset is quite substantial, which explains a relatively low 
fiscal multiplier (Figure 4).  
The monetary authority would react in this simulation to a decline in observed 
and expected inflation by lowering the interest rate by 20 basis points by 2013, after 
which the rates would move slowly back to neutral (Figure 5a).
13 We remind the read- 
er that we are describing the rates relative to what their path would be in the absence 
of fiscal consolidation, and that by assumption the policy rate does not move down 
in 2011. The fact that the lowest rate (relative to the baseline) is projected for 2013 is 
due to some inertia in the interest rate rule and a persistent fall in demand. The real 
interest rate would rise somewhat in 2011 as inflation declines while the nominal rate 
is not yet allowed to react, and then fall along with the policy rate. 
The nominal exchange rate would depreciate about 0.5 percent in 2012 rela-
tive to the baseline as the interest rate cut opens a differential with foreign interest 
rates (Figure 5b). As the current account improves thanks to import compression and 
higher exports, the nominal exchange rate will start appreciating. The real exchange 
rate will behave in a similar fashion, except thanks to a somewhat smaller inflation 
differential with the trading partners than in the baseline, the initial depreciation is 
somewhat larger, and subsequent appreciation is smaller in real than in nominal 
 
12 As noted below, the exchange rate would depreciate (relative to the baseline) in response to a drop in
aggregate demand and a reduction in the policy rate triggered by fiscal consolidation. It is possible that
fiscal consolidation would improve investor confidence and lower Czech Republic’s risk premia, leading 
to a stronger exchange rate. This mechanism is outside our model. It would not necessarily imply a larger
impact of fiscal consolidation, as higher confidence and lower risk premia would reduce interest rates and
stimulate investment and consumption, potentially making up for the smaller improvement in net exports. 
13 With lower stock of government debt, the new equilibrium level of interest rates will be somewhat
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Figure 5a  Interest Rates      Figure 5b  Exchange Rates 
 Percentage Point      Percentage Point 
 Deviation from Baseline    Deviation from Baseline 
                   
 
Figure 6  Current Account and Trade Balance 
Deviation from Baseline, Percent of GDP 
                       
 
terms. In the long run, the real exchange rate essentially returns to its initial value. 
The trade balance and the current account improve due to stronger exports and 
weaker imports (Figure 6). In the  medium term, the  improvement in the  current 
account, at 2.1 percent of GDP, reflects one for one the strengthening of the fiscal 
balance. The trade balance rises somewhat less, as the current account is also sup-
ported by higher net income receipts thanks to an improving net foreign asset po-
sition. 
Finally, we explore the importance of our assumptions about monetary-policy 
constraints and about credibility. If the monetarty policy rate was to respond to 
the consolidation in the first year, we find that it would ease by approximtaly 10 ba-
sis points, and mitigate the  fall in real GDP by only 0.06 percent. As discussed 
above, the small impact is due to the the high degree of openness. We also find that 
an immediately credible fiscal consolidation would have a slightly smaller impact on 
output. On the  other hand, if the  2011 budget package could not earn credibility 
until 2013, the level of real GDP would be lower by a 0.25 percent in 2012 and 2013. 
While these results confirm the benefits of credible policies and room for monetary- 
-policy maneuver, they also show that our estimates of the fiscal multiplier are not 
very sensitive to the specific assumptions we have made. 
6. Further Consolidation 
With consolidation limited to the measures in the 2011 budget, fiscal deficits 
in the Czech Republic would stay around 3½ percent of GDP in the medium term, 
and then increase further as the  finances of the  pension and health care systems 
deteriorate under demographic pressures. Hence, further adjustment is unavoidable. 
The government has set a goal of balancing the budget by 2016. By our estimates, Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4                                    321 
this implies a tightening of about 3½ percent of GDP, spread over 5 years from 2012 
to 2016. 
Given the  overall amount of consolidation to achieve, the  government will 
have to decide on the pace of adjustment and on the instruments to use. The tradeoff 
bearing on the speed is not considered in this article. Clearly, a more front-loaded 
consolidation will inflict more short-term pain, but will also bring benefits sooner. 
A theoretically interesting case arises when a credible promise of future tightening 
(say, cut in government consumption) may generate an increase in GDP today, as 
agents start spending some of the future increase in wealth even before the cut takes 
place and affects aggregate demand directly. This sounds very attractive in a situation 
many countries are facing now, with the economy below capacity but expected to re-
cover in the future, as it would allow to even out the path of the output gap. The prac-
tical applicability of this case, however, is questionable, as markets tend to not put 
much trust in promises of future adjustment. Hence, in this section we will simply 
assume that the adjustment is distributed uniformly over 5 years in 0.7 percentage 
point increments.  
We focus on the question by what means to achieve this adjustment. The key 
point that we would like to make is that the impact on the economy varies dramati-
cally depending on the choice of instruments. Obviously, many other considerations, 
including fairness, societal preferences, political feasibility, legal constraints, and 
ease of implementation, have a bearing on the issue, but the impact on the economy 
should definitely be kept in mind. 
This point was already demonstrated in Section IV, where shocks to different 
fiscal instruments were shown to have rather different effect on output, both in 
the short and in the long run. Interested readers could construct their own consoli-
dation packages as linear combinations of the basic shocks and gauge their impact 
approximately by combining the responses.  
We will illustrate the point further by showing the effect of two packages  
that we consider plausible. In the first package, the 3½ percentage point increase 
in the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP is achieved by cutting government consumption 
(40 percent of the adjustment), reducing general transfers (20 percent), and raising 
the consumption tax (40 percent). This package contains several attractive features. 
Specifically, expenditure cuts account for most of the  consolidation (60  percent); 
public investment is not affected; transfer reductions do not target liquidity-con-
strained households (who have higher marginal propensity to consume); and addi-
tional revenue is raised through the least distortionary tax.  
As a less attractive alternative, we consider consolidation via higher labor taxes 
(70 percent of the adjustment) and lower government investment (30 percent). These 
are two measures to which governments in need of fiscal adjustment frequently resort 
– indeed, they are part (although only a small part) of the 2011 consolidation pack-
age. In particular, governments often find reducing investment politically easier than 
laying off public employees or reducing their wages, shrinking services provided by 
the government, or cutting subsidies and other transfers. It should be noted, however, 
that reducing public investment not only dampens aggregate demand contemporane-
ously, but also lowers the economy’s productive potential for years to come. Similar-
ly, the payroll tax may fall on a somewhat narrower base than the consumption tax, 
which could be a reason why raising it may be more politically expedient.
14 How- 
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Figure 7  Impact of Additional Consolidation on Real GDP with Different Instruments 
Percent Deviation from Baseline 
                            
 
ever, the payroll tax is much more distortionary, and hence harmful to output, than 
the consumption tax.
15 
Since the  additional consolidation starts in  2012, when the Czech  Republic 
will likely have a fairly small negative output gap, we allow the monetary policy to 
respond to the fiscal impulse. We assume again that it would take a year for the new 
consolidation package to become credible. We show the results in Figure 7. 
The difference between the consequences of the two approaches to consolida-
tion is dramatic. While the impact in the first year is nearly identical, the negative 
impact of the more growth-friendly consolidation on output bottoms out in 2013 at 
negative ¼ percent, and from 2015 onwards real GDP exceeds its baseline level, with 
a steady-state gain of 1½ percent. In contrast, under the second option the negative 
impact keeps growing, with real GDP in the steady state more than 3 percent below 
the baseline.  
There are two reasons for the  very shallow decline in output in our first 
package. The first is the gradual pace of consolidation. The immediate impact on ag-
gregate demand – direct, via lower government consumption, and indirect, via lower 
disposable income – is rather small in the first two years of extra consolidation. 
The second reason comes through expectations. As private agents come to expect 
higher GDP and lower payroll taxes (the payoff from consolidation) in the future, 
they feel wealthier and decrease their saving. This partially offsets the negative im-
pact of lower government consumption on aggregate demand.
16  
In case the assumption that as early as 2013 private agents will fully anticipate 
the total extent of future consolidation appears too strong, we have simulated a dif-
ferent scenario. In this “I’ll believe it when I see it” scenario, households are assum-
ed to expect that the adjustment achieved up to the current year is there to stay, but 
they do not anticipate further tightening until it happens. So in 2012 they expect 
a permanent adjustment of 0.7 percent of GDP. In 2013, they come to expect another 
permanent fiscal balance improvement of 0.7 percent of GDP on top of that, i.e. 
a cumulative tightening of 1.4 percent of GDP. It is not until 2016 that their expec-
tations catch up fully with the government’s program.  
14 Particularly when levied on employers, even though in general equilibrium the incidence does not matter
– but it affects the perceptions. 
15 The above applies even more to the capital tax, which falls on a still narrower group, but may be more 
damaging to real GDP, than the payroll tax. 
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Figure 8  Impact of Additional Consolidation on Real GDP 
with Stepwise Increase in Credibility 
Percent Deviation from Baseline 
                            
 
This modification does not make a big difference, as can be seen from Figure 8. 
Under the first option, output lingers slightly longer below the baseline in the case of 
slower gains in credibility, but makes up ground quickly once the expectations adjust 
fully. As to the second option, less credibility would actually reduce the negative im-
pact on GDP in the short run, as the channel under which expectations of future de-
terioration affect current behavior does not operate fully until 2016. But again, the dif-
ference is not major.   
7. Conclusion 
In this article we have estimated the impact of fiscal consolidation on the Czech 
economy using a version of the IMF’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model 
calibrated for the Czech Republic and the EU. The model is firmly rooted in eco-
nomic theory and rich enough to allow quantitative policy analysis. 
We found fiscal multipliers to be quite small, ranging from virtually zero to 
0.5, depending on the instrument and auxiliary assumptions, in terms of first year 
impact on real GDP. This reflects the openness of the Czech economy to trade and 
capital flows as well as the flexibility of its exchange rate and is broadly in line with 
most of the literature, although considerably lower than the generic multiplier of  
0.5–0.6 that the CNB appears to use. 
We have emphasized that the effect of fiscal consolidation cannot be sum-
marized in one number. First, the impact goes beyond one year. Second, one might 
be interested in the behavior of many variables – the current account, the exchange 
rate, the interest rates, the inflation rate – and not just real GDP in response to a fiscal 
shock. Third, the response depends not only on the size of the reduction in the budget 
deficit, but also on the instrument – expenditure or revenue category – through which 
the reduction is achieved. It also depends on the reaction of monetary policy – which 
may be constrained if the  policy rate is at or close to the  low bound. Finally, it 
matters whether the tightening is short-lived or sustained, and also what the private 
sector believes about the durability of the adjustment in case of consolidation span-
ning several years. 
For these reasons we have compiled the responses of output to a standardized 
fiscal shock (a one percent of GDP tightening) for a variety of instruments (three dif-
ferent taxes and four different ways to cut government expenditure), consolidation 
time horizons, and assumptions about monetary policy and the credibility of adjust-
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other small open economies will find these detailed estimates useful in evaluating 
the impact of any consolidation (or stimulus, for that matter) package of interest to 
them. Obviously, these responses can also serve as an input into a discussion about 
the optimal size, pace, and composition of fiscal adjustment – which is a very rele-
vant issue around the globe. 
To highlight a few of these results, cuts in general transfers have the smallest 
negative impact on output, and cuts in government investment have the largest. 
Among the taxes, for a lasting consolidation, higher consumption taxes have the low-
est negative impact in the first few years, and the labor taxes the highest.
17 Monetary 
policy has the ability to counteract the contractionary effect of fiscal consolidation, 
but the offset it provides is relatively small in the short run for most instruments. 
Higher credibility of fiscal adjustment reduces the negative impact of fiscal tighten-
ing in the short term for all instruments, except labor and capital income taxes.  
We have evaluated the impact of the consolidation package specified in the 2011 
budget. The package envisages a permanent tightening of 2 percent of GDP (relative 
to the baseline of unchanged policy), implemented mostly through expenditure cuts, 
particularly to government consumption. This composition is fairly benign in terms 
of its impact on growth. According to the  model, implementation of the  package 
would reduce real GDP by 0.7  percent in  2011, implying a  first-year multiplier   
of 1/3. Then output would start to recover gradually, and in the long run real GDP 
would be 0.2 percent higher than in the baseline, as a stronger fiscal position (par-
ticularly, lower debt level) would allow the government to reduce distortive labor 
taxes.  
The package would be mildly deflationary. It would lead to temporary real 
exchange rate depreciation, reaching 0.6 percent at the peak, and to a gradual, per-
manent strengthening of the  current account balance. It is an  improvement in net 
exports that largely offsets the negative fiscal impulse and explains the small magni-
tude of the multiplier, even as other components of GDP go down. 
Finally, we consider two possible ways through which the government could 
achieve further consolidation in line with its objective of balancing the budget 
by 2016. The two alternatives both assume a gradual improvement in the fiscal bal-
ance of 3½  percent of GDP over the  2012–16 period, but differ in the  choice of 
instruments. The  simulations illustrate the  fact that the  growth impact of fiscal 
tightening depends dramatically on that choice. In the case of a growth-friendly 
package, consisting of cuts in government consumption and general transfers and 
an increase in the consumption tax, the negative impact on output is mild and short- 
-lived, and in the  long run output actually increases. In contrast, the  alternative 
option, comprising a hike in the labor tax and a cut in government investment, would 
put output on a downward slide for a number of years, lowering it by over 3 percent 
in the steady state.  
 
 
17 Because of lags and adjustment costs, the impact of a capital income tax hike is fairly small in the first
year, particularly if it is expected to be reversed soon. The effect, however, grows over time once the pri-
vate sector realizes that the increase will persist. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4                                    325 
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